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I. INTRODUCTION
After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Congress enacted
The Real ID Act of 2005 ("Real ID" or "Act") in response to national
security concerns and, in particular, unreliable standards for driver's li-
censes and identification cards.' Notwithstanding congressional intent,
Real ID faces serious opposition across a wide spectrum of political in-
terests—from information privacy advocates and opponents of expansive
federal government to proponents of  immigrant rights? Several state
legislatures have enacted either objections to or rejections of Real ID's
licensing requirements, while other state legislatures have introduced
similar bills for debate.
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t  J.D. candidate, Seattle University School o f  Law, 2009; B.A., University of  California at Los
Angeles. I  dedicate this Comment to the memory of my father, Stephen P. Allen (B.A. '57), whose
love, encouragement, and unflagging support made my pursuit of a legal education possible. I  also
wish to thank Peter Smith, Magdalena Bragun, and the members of the Seattle University Law Re-
view for their thoughtful and thorough input. Lastly, I owe my biggest debt of gratitude to my loyal,
patient, and loving wife, IrMa, who sacrifices so much to serve our family as I am so often absent
with work and study.
I. Real ID Act of 2005,49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2005). President George W. Bush ordered the 9/11
Commission at its inception to provide Congress with recommendations for the prevention of future
terrorist attacks. See Ariatma Garcia, Comment, The Real ID Act and the Negative Impact on Latino
Immigrants, 9 SCHOLAR 275, 281 (2007). Representative James Sensenbrenner, who introduced the
bill in the House, stated: "The goal of the Real ID Act is straightforward: it seeks to prevent another
9/11 type attack by disrupting terrorist travel." Id. at 285.
2. Alexandra Marks, Why States Are Resisting U.S. on Plan for  REAL ID., CHRISTIAN SCL
MONITOR, Nov. 5, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1105/p02s01-usgri.htm. See
also ACLU, SCORECARD ON FINAL REAL ID REGULATIONS (2008), available at http://www.actu-
co.orgidocumentstReal _ID-Regs_Scorecard_JAN08.pdf.
3. See infra Part
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Despite calls to repeal the Act, some states still plan to comply!'
The Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), the federal agency re-
sponsible for implementing the statute and enforcing compliance, re-
mains resolute in its commitment to implement the licensing provisions.
DHS issued final regulations on January 29, 2008.
5 A l t h o u g h  t h e s e  
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lations take into consideration over 21,000 public comments,
6 p u b l i cconc rn persists: Governor Brian Schweitzer of Montana has urged a
third of the nation's state governors to join him in opposing the imple-
mentation of Real 11/
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2010, citizens of states not in complianee with the mandatoly minimum
requirements of  Real ID may not use state-issued driver's licenses or
4. Under DHS's implementing regulations. states had until March 31 2005, to request an ex-
tension of the initial May I I ,  2008 compliance deadline, or they would have been subject to DRS
enforcement of the statute restricting the use of non-compliant identification documents for air travel
or access to certain federal facilities. See Minnnum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identifiea-
tion Cards Acceptable by
- F e d e r a l  
A g e n c i e
s  
f o r  
O f fi c i
a l  
P u r p





d ,  
R e















2008) (to be codified at 6 CEA. pt. 37) ("OHS wants to make clear that effective May 11. 2008,
individeals from States who have not obtained an extension of the compliance data from OHS, or
who have not submitted a Compliance Package to OHS under the deadlines provided by the final
e, will nor be able to use their State-issued license for federal official purposes, including fur
reification to beard a commercial airplane."). Whi le most states formally requested the official
extension until December 3i , 2099, some states adamantly and publicly rebated to request any ex-
tension from OHS (notably Montana, South Carolina, and Maine), However, OHS acted unilaterally
before March 31. 2008, to grant extensions in the absence of formal requests for those states, so that























































































president will take office. See Eric Keiderman, Real ID Showdown Liveried, STATELINE.ORG„ Apr.
4, 2008, httplIsitateline.orglivel detailsistory?comentld=297809 ( "W ith the immediate criSiE
averted, the next showdown could come at the end of the extension, in January 2010, when there will
be a new Congess, a different president and very likely another secretary of honieland security.").
5. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272-01 (Jan. 29, 2008) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt.
37). OHS appears determined to enforce fully the restrictions imposed by Real ID wen holders
norteompliant licenses or  identity documents_ I n  a recent interview, DHS spokesperson Laura
Keehrier, responding to allegations that the federal government will not s,anetion citizens of states •
that opt out of the Real ID program, stated, "There will be a practical consequence for residents of
states whose leadership chooses the status quo and accepts noncompliant licenses, For  example,
they will not [be] able to fly on an aircraft or eMer a federal building with a noncompliant license."
See Spencer S, Hsu, Homeland Security Retreats From Facets of  'Real ID', W ASH. POST, Nov 4,

















































































7. See. e.g.. ACLU, supra note 2.
8_ ,Slehweitzer Seeks' Allies Again e o t  ID BILLINGS GAzETTE, Jan, 19 2C S O
) O U O t I ehttp".//www.billingsgazetto.notheiticles/200810!!191nevVsistater55-schweitzer.ixt. ' r  regaot to Mon-
tana's intendons to participate in Real ID, Governor Schweitzer has commented, 'NO. Nope. No
Hell no S e e  Governor Signs Law Rejecting Real ID Act, BILLINGS GAZETTE, 'Apr. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.billingsgazetearictiarticles12007/0411 7/newsistate/28-lawaxt.
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identification cards to pass airport security or to access certain federal
facilities.
9 Real ID restricts using driver's licenses or other identification cards
for federal purposes, such as air travel, unless the states issuing the doc-
uments comply with Real ID's requirements.
m S t a t e - i s s u e d  
d r i v e r ' s  
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censes are currently the d  facto standard identification document within
the United States." Citizens and other residents most frequently rely
upon driver's licenses to establish personal identity and obtain other
forms of identification.
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standards and procedures, proponents of Real ID argue that relying upon
state-issued driver's licenses for personal identification creates a security
risk that only federal standards can mitigate." In  response, states oppos-
ing Real ID protest that the Act is an attempt by the federal government
to coerce state compliance with federally mandated standards for driver's
licenses, resulting in a de facto national identification systern.
14
9. Real ID went into effect on May 11, 2008. As  of the writing of this Comment, DHS has
granted initial compliance extensions to all fifty states. However, the initial extension period will
expire on December 31, 2009. Thereafter, an additional extension until May 11, 2011 will only be
available to those states that request an extension and are deemed by DHS to be in material compli-
ance with eighteen prescribed milestones. DHS has singled out a state's ability to verify immigra-
tion status in the United States as one of  the most important of those milestones. See Minimum
Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Offi-
cial Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. at 5274. DHS admits that citizens of non-Real ID compliant states "will
likely encounter significant travel delays." See id.
10. Real ID Act of 2005,49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2005).
11. Serge Egelman & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The REAL ID Act: Fixing Identity Documents with
Duct Tape, 2  US J.L. &  POL'Y INFO. SOC'Y 149, 150 (2006), available at  http://wwwis-
journal.orgNO2101/21SJLP149.pdf. Al l  fifty states include photographs on the driver's licenses they
issue. Approximately 227 million people hold driver's licenses or identification cards issued by
states and the states collectively issue or renew nearly 70 million such documents each year. Ran-
dall Mildcelsen, U.S. Readies "Reasonable" ID Card Rules After Debate, FIN. EXPRESS, Jan. 12,
2008, http://www.financialexpress.cominews/US-readies-reasonable-ID-card-rules-after-debate/260
393/.
12. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for  Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,820, 10,827 (Mar. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 37).
13. See Delvin Barrett, US Unveils New Driver's License Rules, NEWSVINECOM, Jan. 10,
2008, http://www.newsvine.com/ news/2008/01/10/1218356-us-unvei Is-new-drivers- l icense-rules.
14. See infra Part ILA. Privacy experts echo this contention. See ELEC. INFO. PRIVACY CIR.
(EPI C)  ET  AL. ,  COMMENTS O N DEPARTMENT OF HO MELAND SECURITY'S NO T I CE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING:  M I NI M UM  ST ANDARDS F O R DRI VER'S  LI CENSES A N D  IDENTIF ICATION CA RDS
ACCEPTABLE B Y  F EDERAL AGENCIES FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES 2
-
3 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t  h t t p : / /
e p i c . o r g t
privacy/id-cards/epic_realid_comments.pdf [hereinafter EPIC Comments]; see also Letter from
Mark Sanford, Governor of South Carolina, to Michael Chertoff, Secretary of  the Department of
Homeland Security (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.realnightmare.orginews [hereinafter
Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff] ("Real ID upsets the balance of power between the
federal government and the states by coercing the states into creating a national ID system for fed-
eral purposes."). Thi s Comment argues that by embracing compliance with the Act, states must
surrender their historical right to regulation driver licensing; by rejecting the Act, states risk exclud-
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States should challenge the Real ID under the federalism principles
enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, although the Act's driver licensing
provisions infringe on both individual and state constitutional rights. A
state challenge under the Tenth Amendment is more likely than modern
individual rights jurisprudence to succeed in striking down Real ID. Ar -
guing that the federal government impermissibly coerces state action un-
der the Act will better protect both states and individual rights and suc-
ceed in having the Act overturned.
Part II of this Comment provides a historical context for the enact-
ment of Real ID and describes its reception by the states. Part III surveys
relevant principles of constitutional federalism and discusses three Su-
preme Court cases commonly cited by states opposing the Act. Part IV
argues that the statutory scheme under Real ID interferes with state sov-
ereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment and potentially violates fun-
damental individual constitutional rights. Finally, Part V concludes that
judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment in the context of Real ID
vindicates both the integrity of state governments and important rights of
state citizens.
B. BACKGROUND
Before considering the constitutional concerns with the driver li-
censing provisions in Real ID, one must understand the history surround-
ing public resistance to national identification cards and the enactment of
Real ID. This  Part describes the historical opposition toward a national
identification system in the United States and analyzes the primary pro-
visions of the Act, its implementing regulations, and the opposition these
provisions face from state governments.
A. National Identification Resistance and the Enactment of Real ID
The debate over whether to implement a national identification card
is not new. The federal government introduced Social Security numbers
(SSN) in 1936 to serve as account numbers for Social Security benefits.
15Although the use of the SSN has expanded considerably, particularly in
the age of electronic commerce, politicians and the public have consis-
tently rejected efforts to make them universal identifiers.
I6 D u r i n g  h i sadministration, President Reagan strongly opposed a proposal by the At-
ing their citizens from access to important federally regulated services, such as domestic air travel
and access to federal courts. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. For a detailed discussion of the historical opposition of American citizens to national iden-
tification card proposals, see EPIC Comments, supra note 14.
16. In 1977, the Carter Administration reiterated that the SSN was not to become an identifier.
See id.
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tomey General that an identification card system was necessary to reduce
illegal immigration." Congress has struck down similar proposals to
improve the integrity of Social Security cards by converting them into
photo identification.
18 Public resistance toward a national standardization of identification
documents endures today. For example, a section of the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1999 (IIRIRA)" im-
posed federal standards for state driver's licenses and birth certificates
used as identification for federal purposes.
m T h e  s e c t i o n  
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public criticism, with opponents alleging that its passage was a step to-
ward a national identification system.
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Real ID as rekindled heated opposition against standardizing identifica-
tion documents.
Historically, states control the licensing of drivers within their terri-
tories. Before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (IRTPA) passed,
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17. Dennis Behreandt, Pushing National IDs: Congress Tried Its Best to Shackle the Nation
with a National ID Through Passage of the Real ID Act, NEW AM., July 9, 2007, at 2, available at
2007 WLNR 13759696 (citing account by Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute that a second cabinet
member asked Attorney General William French Smith, "Why not tattoo a number on each Ameri-
can's forearm?" President Reagan reportedly responded to the question, "My God, that's the mark
of the beast.").
18. See Egelman, supra note 11, at 150.
19. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Before September 11, 2001, bipartisan support grew for  legislation
aimed at discouraging national standards for identification documents. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA,
MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE & TODD TATELMAN, IMMIGRATION ANALYSIS OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF
THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005, at 29 n.89 (2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organ-
izationM2995.pdf.
20. See GARCIA, LEE, & TATELMAN, supra note 19. The provisions offered states the choice
between requiring inclusion of an individual's SSN in a machine-readable or visually readable for-
mat or requiring that each applicant submit his or her SSN for verification of validity with the Social
Security Administration. I n  the face of public opposition, Congress blocked funding of the imple-
menting regulations for these SSN requirements.
21. See EPIC Comments, supra note 14, at 29.
22. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638 (2004), repealed in part by 49 U.S.C. § 3030 (2005). The Act required the establishment of
new standards aimed at ensuring the integrity for federal use of birth certificates, state-issued driv-
er's licenses and identification cards, and social security cards; states may receive grants to assist
with the implementation of the proposed birth certificate and driver's license standards. See also
RICHARD F. GRIMMET, 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS: IMPLEMENTATION STATUS 3(2006).
This grant incentive program contrasts sharply with the approach taken in Real ID towards imposi-
tion of  federal standards. Congress permissibly could induce state governments to adopt federal
licensing standards through a traditional incentive program. See discussion supra Part III. T he
penalty imposed under the Real ID unconstitutionally coerces state governments to implement fed-
eral standards. See discussion supra Part IV.
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ing the standards for driver's licenses and personal identification cards.
23Even with the passage of IRTPA, most licensing standards remained sub-
ject to the discretion of state and local govemments.
24 T h e  f e d e r a l  
g o v -
ernment, however, perc ives security vulnerability in this patchwork of
differing state standards for driver's licenses?' Real ID attempts to make
licensing processes more secure by  requiring uniformity from the
states.
26 To address these security concerns, Representative F. James Sen-
senbrenner (R-Wisconsin) introduced the Ac t
27 a s  a  m e a s u r e  
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disrupt terrorist travel and prevent another terrorist attack like the one on
September 11111.
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emergency supplemental appropriations bill that included funding for the
war in Iraq and tsunami victims in Southeast Asia." The bill passed the
23. See GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at 29. For a detailed survey of various state
driver licen ing practices and procedures, including discussion of post 9/11 security reforms under-
way across the fifty states, see Egelman, supra note I I ,  at 149.
24. 1RTPA contained a number of provisions that appeared significantly less intrusive upon
state sovereignty. See GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at 29-30. Notably, that legisla-
tion mandated a process of negotiated rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, as
opposed to the notice and comment rulemaking permitted under Real ID. Id. at 31. The negotiated
rulemaking process is intended to include representatives from state and local offices that issue
driver's licenses and identification cards, state elected officials, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, and other interested parties. Regulations promulgated under IRTPA must set minimum stan-
dards, but they are prohibited from infringing upon a state's power to set criteria for applicant eligi-
bility categories and from requiring a state to take action that conflicts or otherwise interferes with
full enforcement of state criteria concerning eligibility categories. IRTPA also prohibits regulations
requiring any uniform document design and i t includes procedures designed to protect individual
privacy rights of applicants. See id. at 30-31.
25. Grimmet, supra note 22, at 32.
26. Egelman, supra note 11, at 152. However, many states contend that they have already
independently taken many steps leading toward improved security in their respective driver licensing
programs. See Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14 ("(S]outh Carolina has
proactively taken steps, without prompting from the federal government, to establish one of the most
secure driver's licenses in the country [ w ] e  are making the very security upgrades that REAL ID
calls for and are ahead of many states in doing so.").
27. See Garcia, supra note 1, at 285-89 (discussing the treatment of the introduction of the Act
and the related congressional debate); see also Manoj Govindaiah, Comment, Driver Licensing
Under the Real ID Act: Can Current Technology Balance Security and Privacy?, 2006 U. In.  J.L.
TECH. & POCY 201, 202-03 (2006).
28. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, some of the terrorists in the 9/11 attacks had
obtained valid driver's licenses that they used to board the airplanes, despite the hijackers' lack of
lawful immigration status. See Garcia, supra note 1, at 285.
29. Some senators expressed grave concern about the licensing provisions of the Act. F or
example, Senator Lieberman (CT-D) spoke Out against the Real ID Act on the Senate floor: "The
Real ID Act would repeal much of the work from last year, and replace it with provisions that im-
pose on state governments unworkable standards for driver's licenses." See id. at 287 n.87.
30. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
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House by a 368-58 vo te
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some members urged removal of the Real ID provisions.
32
B. The Provisions of Real ID and Proposed Implementing Regulations
Real ID restricts the use of state-issued driver's licenses or identifi-
cation cards fo r federal purposes unless states implement the Act's l i-
censing requirements. T h e  Act mandates that the states comply with
standards affecting the issuance and appearance o f  driver's licenses and
identification cards and maintain motor vehicle databases that contain
specific personal information about state citizens.
Section 202 is the meat of Real ID. I t  provides: "Beginning three
years after the date o f  the enactment o f  this division, a Federal agency
may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or identifica-
tion card issued by a state to any person unless the state is meeting the
requirements o f  this section."
33 T h e  A c t  
e x p r e s s l y  
r e p e a l
s  
t h e  
p r e v i
o u s
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act o f  2004 (IRTPA),
3 4which had included potentially conflicting provisions regarding national
standards for driver's licenses?' Although Real ID does not directly im-
pose federal standards upon the states, state governments must adopt
federal standards and modify any conflicting laws to ensure that state
driver's license or identification cards are recognized for official federal
purposes.36 Specifically, the Act requires particular (I ) eligibility crite-
ria, (2) procedures, and (3) database sharing.
First, to issue a driver's license or identification card, the Act re-
quires states to verify the issuance, validity, and completeness o f  certain



















































must also verify an applicant's lawful status in the United States before
iss ing a driver's license or identification card.
38 T h e  A c t  
i d e n t i fi e s  
s e v -
eral categories o f  lawful status, many o f  which are temporary immigra-
29).
31. See Garcia, supra note 1, at 286 n.86 (citing GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at
32. Id at 287 n.87.
33. 49 U.S.C. § 30301.
34. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638 (2004).
35. GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at 31.
36. M at 31 n.102.
37.49 U.S.C. § 30301 (requiring presentation for verification of either: (1) a photo identifica-
tion document, or a non-photo document containing both the individual's full legal name and date of
birth; (2) date of birth; (3) proof of a SSN or verification of the applicant's eligibility for an SSN;
and (4) name and address for the individual's principal residence).
38. See GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at 31-32. 1RTPA expressly prohibited
agency regulation that interferes with this historical state authority over eligibility categories.
238 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:1:231
lion statuses subject to DHS jurisdiction?' I t  also establishes a system of
temporary driver's licenses and identification cards for issuance to cer-
tain temporary residents and sets the maximum validity period for any
regular driver's license at eight years.
4 Second, Real ID mandates particular licensing procedures.
41 E v e nthe physical app arance of a driver's license or identification card falls
within the purview of  the statutory standards. States that issue non-
compliant driver's licenses must indicate to federal officials, by a unique
design or color on the face of the card, that the card is not acceptable for
federal purposes.
42 
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type of identification information that states must include on these doc-
uments.'"
Third, the Act requires states to maintain and share motor vehicle
databases. The databases must contain all data fields printed on driver's
licenses or identification cards as well as driver histories, including mo-
39. 49 U.S.C. § 30301. The classes of residents whose immigration status must be verified by
the state include lawful permanent residents; conditional permanent residents; approved asylum
applicants; holders of valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa status; applicants for temporary protected
status; and individuals with pending applications for adjustment of status. Neither the Act nor the
proposed DHS regulations require that documents include citizenship information, although some
states have expressed interest in having Real ID compliant documents serve as land and sea border
crossing documents for their citizens under the Western Hemisphere Travel initiative.
40. Before Real ID, states were free to establish validity periods as they saw fit. I n  contrast,
under Real ID, temporary licenses are to be issued for a validity period coterminous with the appli-
cant's underlying period of authorized stay in the United States. The statute requires clear identifica-
tion of temporary cards on the face of the document. Id.
41. Real ID requires states to adopt the following procedures and practices: (1) employ tech-
nology to capture digital images of identification source documents such as birth records; (2) retain
paper copies of source documents for a minimum of seven years or images of source documents for
a minimum of ten years; (3) subject each applicant to a mandatory biometrics image capture; (4)
confirm with the Social Security Administration a SSN presented by an applicant by using the full
SSN; (5) subject all persons authorized to manufacture or produce driver's licenses or ID documents
to appropriate security clearance requirements; (6) refuse to issue a new card to a person holding a
driver's license issued by another state without confirmation that the person is terminating or has
terminated that prior driver's license; and (7) establish training for  state licensing employees to
identify fraudulent documents. See GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at 32-33 (summariz-
ing select provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 30301).
42. See id. at 33. Al though this provision apparently permits states to continue issuing non-
compliant licenses and identification documents, it obliges state governments to notify federal agents
of the decision to issue non-compliant documents.
43. See Minimum Standards for  Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,820 (Mar. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 37). DHS's Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking (Proposed Rule) stipulates the following
biographic and information and security features: full legal name; date of birth; gender; a unique
driver's license number or other identification card number (not the SSN); a full facial digital photo-
graph; address of principal residence; expiration dates; signature; certain physical security features;
and a common, machine-readable technology.
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tor vehicle violations and suspensions."
4 I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
t h i s  
r e q u i r e m e n
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has greatly troubled proponents of individual privacy who are concerned
about the security o f  personal data within massive, integrated data-
bas s." Many  fear that an int grated system of state databases could
offer malefactors a one-stop-shop for personal information." The stan-
dardization of information and interstate integration of state databases
increase the likelihood that Real ID-compliant cards will become a na-
tional identification card of the kind feared and reviled by many citi-
zens.47
In its proposed rule, DHS acknowledges at least three key privacy
concerns presented by the Act: (1) the connectivity of the databases; (2)
the protection of personal information stored in the state databases; and
(3) the protection of personal information stored on machine-readable
technology on the license or identity documents." However, DHS states
that the recommended architecture for implementing interstate data ex-
changes does not create a national database because it leaves the meth-
44. See GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at 33-34. For  a thorough treatment of the
privacy related issues raised by Real ID's licensing provisions, as well as formal objections submit-
ted to DHS by privacy experts, see EPIC Comments, supra note 14.
45. Many privacy experts cite vulnerabilities in large databases containing personally identifi-
able data and harshly criticize the legislation for failing to include language that expressly provides
minimum privacy standards. A s  acknowledged by DHS in its Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking,
"[t]he Act does not include statutory language authorizing DHS to prescribe privacy requirements
for state-controlled databases or data exchanges necessary to implement the Act. This is in sharp
contrast with the express authorization in section 7212 of IRTPA, which was the prior state licensing
provision repealed by the Real ID Act." See Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identifi-
cation Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,825.
46. See Edwin Yolmka, Real ID Act Could Be a Real Nightmare for Privacy, CHI. SUN TIMES,
May 19,2007. Hacking into driver's license databases is a growing problem nationally. interopera-
bility and integration of state databases under Real ID could create an attractive target for hackers,
who by exploiting one weak point in the system architecture could gain access to a treasure trove of
personal data. EPIC advocates for the use of a meta-system of electronically stored personal infor-
mation as a superior choice to the type of consolidated, integrated data system required by Real ID.
See supra note 40; see also Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14 ("To err
really is human. Sometimes it is for nefarious purposes, sometimes it is out of boredom—as was the
case of the last teenager hacking into Pentagon databases—and still other times it's borne Out of
nothing more than curiosity such as when federal employees recently opened the passport files of the
country's three Presidential candidates. But  i f you accept the reality that mistakes do happen and
that bad people do hack into spots they are not supposed to access—does it really make sense to put
all this information into a central database rather than have this information housed independently
across fifty states?").
47. See A. Michael Froomkin, Creating a Viral Federal Privacy Standard, 48 B.C. L. REV. 55,
81 (2007) ("These new Real ID-compliant cards will probably become de facto national ID cards.
At present, there is no sign that the private sector will be prevented from using the cards for authen-
tication or data indexing T h u s ,  even i f  the new cards do not become full national ID cards,
businesses will find these new cards to be such close substitutes for national ID cards. ..." ) .
48. See Minimum Standards for  Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,825.
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odology of the data exchanges to the discretion of the states; no federal
agencies will operate the data exchanges affecting non-commercial driv-
er's licenses.
° Without the Real ID Act, however, states would be under no obli-
gation to share access to their databases and would retain full authority to
implement privacy protections suitable to the expectations of their citi-
zenry and consistent with their state constitutions." Real ID, therefore,
limits the discretion of states to choose standards for licensing eligibility,
establish procedures for producing identification documents, and main-
tain data records. Many  states vehemently protest this curtailment of
freedom.
51
C. State Opposition to Real ID
State opposition to the licensing provisions o f  Real ID has bur-
geoned since the law passed in May 2005. Some states have passed leg-
islation rejecting the Act outright and refusing its implementation, while
others have proposed legislation to the same effect.
Reasons for  this opposition vary, but three consistent themes























































pliance with the new licensing standards is financially unrealistic.
53 T h eNational Governors Association estimates that compliance w ill cost
states over $11 billion within the first five years.
54 S t a t e s  w i l l  
n e e d  t o49. See id. at 10,826 ("These two provisions mandate the State-to-State data exchange, how-
ever, the Notice of  Proposed Rulemaking contemplates that the States will work out the business
process and data access rules necessary to implement these provisions before May 11, 2008 by
means of a collective governance structure."). The proposed regulations cite a preliminary example
of such an arrangement by representatives of the DMVs of California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and
New York; however, DHS is conspicuously silent as to the expected costs of such a fifty-state col-
lective governance structure. Id.  Also, DHS indicated in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
neither it nor the Department of Transportation will collaborate with states on the privacy protections
nd access provisions for any state-to-state data exchange. Id.
50. See discussion infra Part II.C.
51. See Schweitzer Seeks Allies Against Real ID, supra note 8.
52. Those privacy concerns are (1) the connectivity of the databases; (2) the protection of per-
sonal information stored in the states' databases; and (3) the protection of  personal information
stored on machine-readable technology on the license or identity documents. Minimum Standards
for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for  Official Pur-
poses, 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,825.
53. See Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14 ("It seems to me there is
something wrong when the federal government imposes the burdens of creating a national ID system
on the states—but only pays for two percent of the cost.").
54. See Testimony of Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley, Before Joint Commit-
tee on Veterans and Federal Affairs, (2007), available at hup://www.realnightmare.orgiimages/File/
Testimony°420of%20Attorney%20General%20Coakley%20on%20Real%201D%20Act.pdf [herein-
after Coakley Testimony]; see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NAT'L
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invest an estimated 21 million person-hours of computer programming to
adapt their systems to the eligibility verification and database design re-
quirements.
55 
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phased adaptation, high costs remain a serious concern, particularly in
the absence of  allocated federal funding.
56 S e c o n d ,  
s t a t e s  
o b j e c t  
t h a t
their own onstitutions provide greater civil liberty protections than the
U.S. Constitution.
57 
O b j e c t i o
n s  
b a s e
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common.58 Finally , despite opposition from more than 600 organiza-
tions, the Act passed without sufficient deliberation, and it received nei-
ther a hearing by any congressional committee nor a vote solely on its
merits.
59
GOVERNORS ASS'N & AM. ASS'N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM'RS, THE REAL ID ACT: NATIONAL
IMPACT ANALYSIS 3 (2006).
55. See Coakley Testimony, supra note 54, at 2.
56. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for  Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272-01, 5281 (Jan. 29, 2008) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 37) (describing the implementation timeline for Real ID, which includes a deadline of
May 11, 2008, for state certification of compliance with the provisions of the Act). The final rule
provides a process for states to seek an additional extension of the compliance deadline to May 11,
2011, by demonstrating material compliance with the core requirements of the Act. Id. at 5272. Al l
driver's licenses and identification cards must be Real ID-compliant by May 11, 2014, for people
born after December 1, 1964, and by December 1, 2017, for those born on or after December 1,
1964. I d  In promulgating its final regulations, DHS claims that this initial estimate will be reduced
ignificantly to a cost of $3.9 billion, a reduction achieved by regulations that permit states greater
flexibility in issu ng Real ID compliant licenses to older Americans, who must obtain Real ID com-
pliant documentation by December 1, 2014. See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., DHS Re-
leases Real ID  Regulation (Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.dhs.govixnewsiteleases/pr_
1200065427422.shtm (last visited Aug. 11, 2008).
57. Citing data privacy concerns, Washington's statute prohibits implementation or funding of
the statutory program in the absence of federal funding and heightened privacy protections. The
legislation also authorizes the state Attorney General to raise a legal challenge to the Act at the
agreement of the Governor. See S.B. 5087, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).
58. The proposed DHS rule does not make states accountable for personal data they are re-
quired to collect. Common machine-readable technology mandated by the Act will put all informa-
tion appearing on the front of the license (and possibly other personally identifiable data) in wide
circulation with government officials and businesses. Such technology permits easy, computerized
transfer of data on cards to private parties. Even i f successful data protection were possible, personal
data could be harvested by private companies able to develop parallel for-profit databases on citi-
zens. See Coakley Testimony, supra note 54.
59. Legislation by both New Mexico and Massachusetts stresses the insufficiency of congres-
sional deliberation on the merits of Real ID, which passed as part of a broader appropriations bill
that included funding for war effort and natural disaster relief. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 61-5-
128 (2007); S. J. Memorial 11, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007); S.B. 2138, 185th Gen. Court
(Mass. 2007).
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At least eighteen states have enacted legislation rejecting Real ID .
°Maine was the first state to take action, but recently Montana has led the
charge in barring the law's implementation. Montana's governor, Brian
Schweitzer, is asking other governors to join Montana in resisting com-
pliance with Real ID and not accepting the "Faustian bargain" of apply-
ing for an extension to comply from DHS.
61 M o n t a n a ' s  
l e g i s l a t u r e  
e n -
acted a statute asserting that Real ID effectively creates a national identi-
fication card; the statute invoked federalism principles that the imple-
mentatio  of Real ID would violate.
62 A u t h o r s  o f  
t h e  
M o n t a n a  
l e g i s l a
-
tion claim that rather than achieving Congress's goal of increasing secu-
rity measures to thwart terrorists, the Act will provide fodder for identity
thieves.
63 
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upon the State's sovereign power to determine its own policies for identi-
fication, licensing, and credentialing its residents. 64 Nebraska views the
60. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, and
Washington. AC LU , Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States, REALNIGHTMAREORG, http://www.
realnightmare.orginews/105 (last visited Aug. 16, 2008). As  of the writing of this Comment, Ari-
zona is the latest state to join the ranks of states directly opposing the implementation of Real ID.
Governor Napotitan° signed legislation into law on June 17, 2008, that prohibits the executive











































































ple of broad, bipartisan agreement at the state Capitol, with the Democratic governor and GOP-led
Legislature finding common ground in their opposition to Real ID.").
61. See Letter of Brian Schweitzer, Governor of Mont., to Bill Ritter, Governor of Colo. (Jan.
18, 2008) (on file with author). Governor Schweitzer notes that Montana "recognized that Real ID
was a major threat to the privacy, constitutional rights, and pocketbooks of ordinary Montanans."
M  H e  claims the passage of  Montana's bill barring implementation of  Real ID "[s]ent a strong
message to Washington that this unfunded mandate needed to be repealed, and I'm proud to say
Montana's two U.S. senators have gotten behind efforts to do just that at the federal level." Id. I n
his appeal to Governor Ritter, he concludes, " If we stand together, either DHS will blink or Congress
will have to act to avoid havoc at our nation's airports and federal courthouses." Id.
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-128 (2007) ("Whereas, the mandate to the states, through federal
legislation that provides no funding for its requirements, to issue what is, in effect, a national identi-
fication card appears to be an attempt to 'commandeer' the political machinery of the states and to
require them to be agents of  the federal government, in violation of the principles of federalism
contained in the 10th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as construed by the United States Su-
preme Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 1041 (1992), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)."). Montana's enactment contains
nearly identical language to that used by Missouri and Tennessee. See id.
63. See Montana Is Trying to Fight Off the National ID Card, MONT. LAW. 6 (2007). Simi-
larly, Arkansas' measure claims that Real ID's provisions requiring machine-readable technology
would convert state-issued driver's licenses into tracking devices; the legislation also states that Real
ID coerces the states by threatening the freedoms of their citizens. H.B. 2528, 86th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2007).
64. Leg. Res. 28, 100th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2007).
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provisions restricting access to federal facilities and air travel for citizens
of non-compliant states as a threat by the federal government.
65 The legislatures of at least thirteen other states have proposed legis-
lation similar to that enacted in opposition to Real ID.
66 F o r  e x a m p l e ,Massachusetts proposed legislation that explicitly authorizes the Com-

























































eign states in a federal system through Article TV and the Tenth Amend-
ment and stresses that driver licensing is historically a state concern.
68
FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES
Basic federalism principles provide context for evaluating these
state sovereignty concerns. Federalism "refers to the sharing of power
between two separate levels of government, each representing the same
people."
69 
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tution is expressed in the Tenth Amendment, which affirms that the
"powers not expressly delegated by the Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are reserved by the States or the people."
7° T h i s  s y s t e m  
o f  d u a l
sovereignty benefits the people by maintaining the balance of  govern-
mental power and checking tyranny by the federal government.
71
65. Nebraska characterizes restrictions imposed by Real ID as refusing to citizens of  non-
compliant states the privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens of compliant states. See id.
66. See supra note 59.
67. S.13.2138,185th Gen. Court (Mass. 2007).
68. See id. ("Licensing of motor vehicle drivers and the regulation of motor vehicles has been
considered as a state responsibility for more than one hundred years."). Massachusetts complains
that the provisions of the Act that require verification of citizenship or immigration status will place
the Registry of Motor Vehicles staff on the front lines of immigration enforcement by forcing state
employees to determine federal citizenship and immigration status. I d  Echoing a common theme
among several states, New Mexico's proposed bill stresses the more expansive protections of pri-
vacy and civil liberty under its constitution as compared with the federal Constitution. S. J. Memo-
rial 11,48th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2007). I n  addition, as with the legislation of other states, New
Mexico affirms that its constitutional values include a higher level of individual protections under
the state constitution. Id.
69. See Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed Constitu-
tional Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 851,854 (2006)
(quoting DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHrNGTON 20
(1995) ("Federalism is a governmental system that includes a central government and at least one
major subnational tier of governments; that assigns significant substantive powers to both levels
initially by the provisions of a written constitution; and that succeeds over time in sustaining a terri-
torial division of powers by judicial, operational, and representational political means.")).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
71. See Garry, supra note 69, at 859-61. As Professor Garry explains, "The Framers believed
that by its protections of the pre-existing structure of state governments, the Constitution could safe-
ly grant powers to the federal government." Id. at 855. "To the extent that it defines state powers,
the Constitution does so primarily through negative implication, by setting out certain limited con-
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Through the nineteenth century and into the first quarter of  the












































limitation on congressional power.
73 B e g i n n i n g  
i n  t h e  
N e w  
D e a l  
E r a  
a n d
extending through the Warren and Burger Courts, however, a nationalist
model emerged to expand federal powers.
74 D u r i n g  t h a t  
p e r i o d ,  
t h e
Court did not hold that even one law enacted by Congress exceeded leg-
islative Commerce Clause powers, and it determined that only one fed-
eral law violated the Tenth Amendment.














































rate sovereigns, the doctrine was dragged into the modern era despite the
development o f  a stable, centralized national government that better
represents the national community.
77 B u t  t h e  
c o n fl i c t  
o v e r  
i m p l e m e n
t a -
tion of Real ID reveals how federalism is as relevant today to preserving
the liberties of our national citizenry as it was when the Framers con-
ceived the Constitution.
Several of the states opposing Real ID have invoked Supreme Court
cases that scholars argue signal a federalism revival.
78 T h e  C o u r t ' s  
d e c i -
straints on those powers." Id. at 856. A  primary rationale behind the principle of federalism was the
belief that such a governmental structure would help preserve individual liberty. See id. at 852.
72. See id. at 862.




74. Garry, supra note 69, at 862; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 254-64 (discussion
of expansion of federal regulation under Commerce Clause powers beginning during President Roo-
sevelt's New Deal and extending through most of the twentieth century). See, e.g., Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal law setting wheat production quotas as applied against
a farmer who only grew wheat for home consumption and did not sell his crop in interstate com-
merce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding federal legislation prohibiting the
shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured locally within a state by employees paid
less than the statutorily prescribed minimum wage and rejecting the view that the Tenth Amendment
limits Congress's powers); NLRB v. Jones Laughl i n Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding
federal regulation of the steel industry).
75. Garry, supra note 69, at 862.
76. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). Professor Vicki C. Jackson refutes this thesis. See Jackson, infra
note 82.
77 See id at 908-13 (noting that modern community has shifted from localized state-oriented
community to national community, which is not secured by federalism). Professors Rubin and Fee-
ley argue that according to this rationale, the Court Islhould never invoke federalism as a reason for
invalidating a federal statute or as a principle for interpreting it." Id. at 909.
78. See discussion supra Part II.C. That revival followed a long period of expansive congres-
sional regulation of traditionally state-controlled functions under the Commerce Clause. See Garry,
supra note 69, at 851-52, 854 (referring to revival of pre-New Deal Era federalism principles as the
Rehnquist Court's "federalism revival").
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sions in New York v. United States
79 a n d  P r i n t z  
v .  
U n i t e d  
S t a t e s "  
r e fl e c t
this "new federalism."
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sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment and traditional federalism prin-
ciples. T is Part assesses the resistance of the Court to define driver li-
censing as a traditional area of state authority insulated from federal in-
terfer nce and discusses the federalism principles expressed in New York
and Printz.
A. A Traditional Area of State Concern
Real ID treads upon territory traditionally controlled by the states:
driver licensing. A  survey of state pronouncements on the subject re-
flects a strong sentiment among state legislatures that driver licensing
remains a governmental function that states jealously guard.
82 S t a t e shave a comp lling interest in determining skill and residency require-
ments for drivers on their roads; they have direct accountability within
the localities protected by this regulation.
Notwithstanding this historical interest in licensing regulation by
the states, the Supreme Court has not categorically defined driver licens-
ing as a traditional state governmental function.
83 I n d e e d ,  i n  
G a r c i a  
v .
San Antonio Metropolitan Tra sit Authority," the Court rejected as "un-
sound in principle" and "unworkable in practice" the utility of attempts
to define traditional governmental functions as the measure of state au-
79. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
80. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
81. See Garry, supra note 69.
82. See discussion supra Part MC. However, as Professor Vicki Jackson explains in her article
exploring federalism issues raised by Printz, "fflocusing on whether a federal statute interferes with
constitutionally contemplated functions of  state governments may require developing a theory of
core state governmental functions, an enterprise begun in National League of Cities and abandoned
in [Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)1." Vicki  C. Jackson, Federal-
ism and the Uses and Limits of  Law: Printz and Principle?, i l l  HAM,. L. REV. 2180,2254-55
(1998). I t  may be possible to distinguish between uniquely state governmental functions from gen-
erally applicable laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to the states in National League
of Cities. Professor Jackson suggests that Lopez may be characterized as a "mild application of a
reinvigorated requirement that Congress' means of carrying Out its powers must be 'necessary and
proper' to enumerated ends." See id. at 2258. This contrasts with the categorical approach found in
Printz, which Jackson criticizes as failing to identify a constitutional "doctrine that combines in
appropriate degrees recognition of the fundamentally political character of federalism, its overreach-
ing goal of  creating a strong national union, and a textually and historically plausible account of
when that national power is limited by the constitutionally secured interests of the states." See id.
83. Even so, Congress has successfully extended its power to regulate even matters of tradi-
tional state concern under Commerce Clause jurisprudence since the New Deal. CHEMERNSKY,
supra note 77, at 312-18.
84. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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tonomy under the Tenth Amendment.
85 I n  d o i n g  
s o ,  t h e  
C o u r t  
h a s  
r e -
jected the rubric of traditional state governmental functions when evalu-
ating congressional action under the Commerce Clause.
In Garcia, the Court overruled its decision from nine years prior in
National League of Cities and held that the Tenth Amendment does not
prohibit Congress from making a general extension of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to state employees, thus regulating the state as it does pri-
vate actors.
86 I n  
N a t i
o n a l  
L e
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sional regulation of states when legislative action infringed upon "tradi-
tional governmental functions" historically within the purview of state
sovereignty.
87 I n  
G a r c
i a ,  
h o w
e v e






















distinction as unworkable and empirically confusing to the lower federal
courts.88 The Court reasoned that it was "difficult, i f  not impossible, to
identify an organizing principle" to distinguish between discrete gov-
ernmental functions.
89
85. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Scope of State Autonomy Under the United States Constitution,
37 bus .  L. REV. 341,396 (2000). The notion of traditional areas of state concern subsequently saw
some resurgence. I n  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court recognized that some
areas of historical state power, including family law, criminal law enforcement, and education, might
lie beyond Congress' Commerce Clause power. I d  at 567. I n  that case, the Court nullified a con-
gressional enactment that outlawed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school and placed
an outer boundary on Commerce Clause authority as limited to regulation of those economic activi-
ties having a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 265-66
(narrowing definition of interstate commerce to encompass only regulation of (1) channels of inter-
state commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities that have "substantial
relation" to interstate commerce, and warning that Congress should not regulate non-economic mat-
ters that were an area of traditional state concern). Despite public safety aspects of state licensing,
there is an arguably economic aspect to driver licensing, especially given the mobility of modem
society. That mobility could provide the substantial relationship to interstate commerce that could
bring standardization of driver licensing within the ambit of the Commerce Clause under the ration-
ale in Lopez.
86. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
87. Buchanan, supra note 85, at 395.
88. In particular, the Court noted the arbitrary nature of distinctions drawn between areas of
traditional and non-traditional concern and observed that "licensing automobile drivers" and "operat-
ing a highway authority" were labeled "traditional," whereas "operation of a mental health facility"
was characterized as "nontraditional." Id.
89.469 U.S. at 539 ("The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating
traffic, for  example, or between operating a highway authority and operating a mental facility, is
elusive at best."). The Court characterized reliance on a historical standard in drawing the functional
distinction as "illusory" and "arbitrary." I d  Specifically, i t noted that because "[Ole genesis of
state governmental functions stretches over a historical continuum from before the Revolution to the
present, c o u r t s  would have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of state in-
volvement had to be for federal regulatory authority to be defeated." I d  at 544. Further, the major-
ity pointed out that exploration of the traditional or integral nature of state governmental functions
may actually constrict state prerogatives because it inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary
to decide which state policies it favors and which i t dislikes. See Buchanan, supra note 85, at 397
(citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-46).
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Given this overruling of National League of  Cities, lower courts
would likely hesitate before applying a traditional area of state concern
analysis to any judicial review of Real ID or to any similar federal at-
tempt to legislate in the area of driver licensing. The Court has avoided
limiting extensions of congressional authority over many traditional ar-
eas of state concern in favor of a narrower approach that targets legisla-
tion and compels state government action. The decisions in both New
York and Printz reflect this approach.
B. Congressional Coercion: New York v. United States
The Court's decision in New York v. United States marks a depar-
ture from expanding federal authority through Congress' exercise of its
Commerce Clause powers." Although narrowly held as an exception to
those concededly broad powers, the decision reflects a resurgence of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence reminiscent of the early judiciary's so-
licitousness toward state sovereignty within the federal system.
91 In New York, the Court struck down the "take title" provision con-
tained within the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985 because the law coerced state legislatures to take action.
92 A l -though the enactment was the product of extensive negotiation among
the states to address issues of radioactive waste removal and disposal, the
State o f  New York  challenged the statute on Tenth Amendment
grounds.
93 As Professor Buchanan explains in his article The Scope of State
Autonomy Under the United States Constitution, "[i]n substance, Con-
gress commanded the [s]tates to regulate private actor conduct," namely
the creation and disposal of low-level radioactive waste, "[a]ccording to
federally prescribed standards."
94 O s t e n s i b l y ,  
t h e  
t a k e -
t i t l e  
p r o v i s
i o n
gave states a choice: regulate the waste per congressionally mandated
standards or receive title to the waste.
95 T h e  l a t t e r  
a m o u n t e d  
t o  
a  
t r a n s f e
r
by Congress of title o th  waste from private producers to state govern-
ments; the Court liken d such transfer to a "congressionally compelled
subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste producers."
96 W r i t -ing for the majority, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Constitution
90. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
91. See supra note 69.
92. See 505 U.S. at 185-86.
93. Buchanan, supra note 85, at 408-09.
94. Id at 410.
95. M
96. Id at 409.
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would not "authorize Congress to impose either option as a freestanding
requirement."
























































machinery of state government by forcing it to enact or administer a fed-
eral regulatory program.
99 B y  
d e p r i v i n g  
t h e  
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s  
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c h o i





"crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coerc ion."
m A sProfessor Buchanan argues, "The power to enact laws and promulgate
regulations of general applicability within a particular jurisdiction is a
fundamental attribute of governmental sovereignty."
101 A l t h o u g h  C o n -gress has broad authority to preempt state legislation in a particular field
or to induce state legislative action through incentives,
Ice i t  c a n n o t  c o m -pel staes to enact federally prescribed standards into law by threatening
to impose a penalty.103
97. New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
98. See id. at 176. For  an in-depth discussion of various theories of coercion as applied to the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). I n  her seminal article on the subject of unconstitutional conditions,
Professor Sullivan notes that the Court has repeated suggested that the problem with such conditions,
whereby the government grants or withholds a particular benefit upon the beneficiary's surrender of
a constitution right, is their coercive effect. Id. at 1428. However, she identifies inconsistencies in
the Court's account of coercion, observing that the Court has never developed a coherent rationale
for determining the threshold test for coercion. Id. Looking to examples of coercion in both private
law and moral philosophy, Professor Sullivan argues that any useful conception of coercion is irre-
ducible normative. I d  However, she concludes that the indefiniteness of the Court's coercion rea-
soning limits its utility, and she urges looking at other theories in search of a more satisfying ration-
ale to support the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Id. at 1449-56.
99. Garry, supra note 69, at 869 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
100. Id. at 868. "The Constitution instead'[l]eaves to the several States a residuary and invio-
lable sovereignty,' reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment. Whatever the Outer
limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
101. Buchanan, supra note 85, at 412 (noting that a political entity that loses control of  its
legislative agenda retains little sovereignty, particularly when that unit is required to enact laws
according to the strictures imposed by another political unit).
102. Professor Buchanan refers to this legislative technique as "conditional preemption" whe-
reby Congress conditions state regulation of private actor conduct upon the state's willingness to
regulate conduct in accordance with federally prescribed standards. I d  I f  the state opts out of im-
plementing those federal standards, i t suffers no penalty, and Congress simply proceeds to regulate
the conduct itself by directly implementing its own standards. Id. I n  both FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742 (1982), and Hode/ v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981), the Court held that such conditional preemption techniques do not violate state autonomy in
violation of  the Tenth Amendment. Id.  at 355-56. Conditional preemption still offers Congress
wide latitude to obtain state cooperation with federal policy. Professor Jackson argues that the
Printz decision reflects the Court's desire to establish a clear rule-setting boundaries for the exercise
of that congressional discretion. See Jackson, supra note 82, at 2211-12.
103. Professor Buchanan observes: " It is an entirely different matter to say that Congress can
compel states to enact federally prescribed standards into law." Buchanan, supra note 85. He adds:
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In contrast, the dissenting justices in New York characterized the
nuclear waste-disposal act as "the product of cooperative federalism, in
which the states bargained among themselves to achieve compromises
for Congress to sanction."
1134 W r i t i n g  
f o r  
t h e  
d i s s e n t
,  
J u s t i
c e  
W h i
t e  
c i t
e d
the extensive and complex negotiations among the states that led to the
passage of the statute, arguing that New York had "reaped the benefits"
of concessions that other states made in the negotiation process.'"
The majority, however, viewed the boundary drawn by its holding
as a matter of constitutional principle that did not depend upon complic-
ity of state officials in the legislative process.'" States cannot bargain
away their constitutional protections for a limited legislative purpose.
mThe holding in New York, therefore, provides a cogent rationale that can
apply to an examination of the coercive effect of Real ID upon state gov-
ernments. The Court reinforced this rationale with its categorical rejec-
tion in Printz of any law that compels states to either enact or administer
a federal regulatory program.
C. Commandeering of the State Government: Printz v. United States
Printz v. United States continued the Supreme Court's revival of
federalism principles as a constraint on national power.'" In  Printz, the
Court held that the Brady Act's requirement that local law enforcement
officers perform background checks on prospective purchasers of hand-
guns was unconstitutional.
m9 T h e  
C o u r t  
v i e w e d  
t h e  
r e q u i r




congressional command to the states' executive branches to administer
or enforce federal programs, thereby commandeering state governmental
personn l into service of the federal government:
1cl A u t h o r i n g  t h e  
m a -
jority opinion, Justice Scalia broadly int rpreted the reasoning in New
York to identify a clear-cut rule against federal "commandeering" of state
legislative or executive officials. I n  doing so, he drew upon historical
" If the Tenth Amendment contains any 'invisible radiation' that prohibits congressional encroach-
ment on state autonomy, surely the facts of New York represent a case in which that radiation should
be judicially recognized." I d
104. 505 U.S. at 189-94 (White, J., dissenting).
105. M
106. Id at 182.
107. Id ("Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, t h e  departure from
the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state officials.").
108. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). For  a thorough analysis of the Printz decision, see Jackson, supra
note 91, at 2181. Professor Jackson views Printz as a part of the natural progression of decisions
showing increased sensitivity toward federal influence over state governments. I d
109. 521 U.S. at 935.
110. Id at 926-28.
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understanding and practice and found "essential postulates"
111 i n  t h estructure of the Constitution that control its meaning even if  not articu-
lated elsewhere:
12 The reasoning in Printz, thus, sets forth a "categorical principle"
that Congress may not coerce state governments into carrying out a fed-
eral regulatory agenda:
13 A l t h o u g h  
t h e  
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do not commandeer state DMV personnel to act as federal agents,
114 t h e y
111. According to Professor Jackson, Justice Scalia reiterates two arguments raised by
O'Connor in New York. Jackson, supra note 82, at 2191-92. First, Justice Scalia reasons that the
choice of establishing a national government that could operate directly on its citizens went hand in
glove with a compromise to surrender those powers formally held by the Confederated Government
to demand that states act as instruments of federal government. Id. (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 919—
20). Second, he argues that federal commandeering of state governments would interfere with the
constitutional vision "that a State's government will represent and remain accountable to its own
citizens." Id. I n  her article, Professor Jackson questions the historical accuracy of the first proposi-
tion. Id. She cites to Evan Caminker's article, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001,1042-59 (1995),
which suggests that despite historical evidence demonstrating concern with Congress' lack of suc-
cess in requisitioning the states under the Articles of Confederation, it does not follow that the fed-
eral government relinquished that power by adding new powers to legislate directly for citizens. Id.
As for the second proposition, Professor Jackson states that concerns for political accountability do
proceed from the basic constitutional structure but do not support such a rigid rule. Id. at 2191.
112. In defense of the Brady Act, the federal government sought to distinguish New York on
grounds that the statute did not require legislation by the states or any executive policymaking; ra-
ther, i t simply directed state law enforcement agencies to provide limited, non-policy-making assis-
tance. See id. at 2192-93. The Court rejected this reasoning as failing to demarcate clearly policy-
making and limited or ministerial decision making as a useful boundary against federal intrusion,
and it noted that even federally mandated ministerial tasks do not exculpate the state government
from public blame for the statute's burdens or mistakes in its administration. Id. Professor Jackson
criticizes this justification by noting that the sheriffs required to conduct background checks under
the facts of Printz could have communicated effectively to their constituents the actual source of the
burden in the federal government's legislation. Id.
113. Id. at 2194-95 n.70 ( "The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.' C ongr es s  cannot circumvent that prohibition by con-
scripting the State's officers directly. I t  matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no
case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."). Professor Jackson argues that
with its this bright-line rule in Printz, the Court presumably sought to provide lawmakers with a
clear, readily understandable guideline, but such guideline could create a kind of rigidity that con-
trasts with the pragmatism of earlier federalism jurisprudence and hampers the federal government's
ability to respond agilely to national crises. See id. at 2212. For  a discussion of the possible extent
of the Fourteenth Amendment and how its attendant jurisprudence may influence the entire Constitu-
tion more than the Printz' Court's federalism jurisprudence, see id. at 2210-11 ("The text of the
post-Civil War Amendments, as well as precedent upholding federal voting rights statutes mandating
affirmative state acts to adopt voting changes, pose formidable barriers to the Court's applying any
broad rule against federal compulsion of state governments to legislation enacted pursuant to those
amendments.").
114. Real ID does not directly require that state DMV personnel take particular actions, such as
the information reporting requirements under the Brady Act. State governments retain discretion to
manage and control their licensing officials and staff. Nonetheless, the substantive and procedural
2008] A  Choice that Leaves No Choice 2 5 1
do require state governments to take a variety of actions, both legislative
and administrative, to effect compliance with statutory standards.
115
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH REAL ID
A. Coercive Nature of the Real ID Statutory Scheme
The driver licensing scheme set forth under Real ID coerces state
governments in a manner repugnant to the Constitution. Congress may
retain broad powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate a vast array
of activity, but the Court in New York and Printz limited Congress from
using those powers to compel state government action.
116 I n  t h e  F e d e r a l -
standards mandated by Real ID clearly dictate policy for state executive branches to implement. See
discussion supra Part WC.
115. The requirement to take affirmative action is a key element distinguishing the New York
and Printz line of cases from the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement upon Tenth Amend-
ment federalism principles in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). In that unanimous decision, the
Court relied upon an established constitutional law distinction between affirmative obligations and
negative prohibitions to uphold a federal privacy protection law in the face of a state challenge. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 325-26. The case involved a challenge to the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act, a federal law that prohibited states and well as private party actors from disclosing
personal information collected by state DMVs, such as names, addresses, and SSNs. Id.  M any
states engaged in the sale of this information to individuals and businesses. T he Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals declared the law unconstitutional as violating the Tenth Amendment based on that
prohibition. However, the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declar-
ing that the law did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it was a prohibition of conduct, not an
affirmative mandate as in New York and Printz. Id.  C hi ef Justice Rehnquist stated: "It does not
require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. W e accord-
ingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New
York and Printz." Condon, 528 U.S. at 151. Real ID does not fall within that distinction, because it
mandates implementation by states of a program of federal standards that will require affirmative
state action and participation by state agency officials as prohibited by the Tenth Amendment under
the New York and Printz line of cases. See discussion infra Part IV. That mandate applies directly
to states as sovereign entities and does not affect private actors as well, as was the case in Reno v.
Condon.
116. Buchanan, supra note 85, at 359-62. Professor Buchanan separates the methods by which
Congress addresses the states when regulating into three discrete categories. Id. I n  Category One
situations, Congress offers states a choice: in an area subject to federal pre-emption, they may regu-
late private actor conduct in a certain way or  cease to regulate. Id.  I n  Category Two and Three
situations, Congress commands the states, rather than offers choices. Id.  I n  Category Two, Con-
gress regulates states as states by obligating states in a given area to conform their conduct to the
dictates of  congressional regulations either previously or  contemporaneously applied to parallel
private-sector conduct. Id. I n  Category Three, Congress mandates that states regulate private-actor
conduct directly in accordance with federally prescribed standards. Id. I n  both Category Two and
Three situations, the states would incur a penalty or other legal detriment for non-compliance with
the federal directive. I d  Buchanan describes New York as a Category Three situation. Id. B y  re-
quiring that states implement specific federal standards and processes for administering driver l i-
censing and person identification programs, Real ID falls into the third classification, because i t
requires that states directly regulate the conduct of their citizens according to federal standards. Id.
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ism Impact Statement to its proposed regulations,"
7 D H S  p o i n t s  
o u t  t h a t
the Act regulates the federal government itself and not state govern-
ments.118 The agency stresses that the statute binds federal agencies to
reject non-Real ID compliant licenses or identification cards for official
federal purposes.
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plicitly compel any state to issue driver's licenses or other identification
documents according to the statutory scheme, whether the statutory
scheme effectively compels state governments to act remains an open
question for the judiciary.120
1. A Choice that Leaves No Choice
Because the issuance of driver's licenses remains a state regulatory
function, the requirements established in the Act constitute an effective
commandeering by Congress of the state regulatory process and of its
local officials who issue the licenses.
121 A l t h o u g h  
t h e  
f e d e r a l  
g o v e r n -
ment claims t at the Act regulates the federal government, the practical
effect of the statute is upon the apparatus of state governmental power.
State legislatures will need to enact laws to implement the standards es-
tablished by Real ID; state executive agencies will need to conform their
administrative policies and practices to the strictures of the statute.
122 I fthe Act effectively compels state governments, then it coerces states in
violation of the Constitution.
On its face, the driver licensing scheme created by Real ID might
seem distinguishable from the take title provision in New York. I n  that
117. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10820-01, 10,825 (proposed Mar. 9, 2007).
118. Congress may not simply "[c]ommandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by di-
rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Mining Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
119. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,849 ("The proposed rule does not preempt state
law. As detailed elsewhere in this document, the Real ID Act is binding upon Federal agencies,
rather than on States. The proposed rule would not formally compel any state to issue driver's li-
censes or identification cards that will be acceptable for federal purposes.").
120. The question is raised by several state bills citing New York and Printz and in analytical
literature, including the CRS Report. See discussion supra Part WC; GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN,
supra note 19.
121. GARCIA, LEE & TATELMAN, supra note 19, at nn.92 & 102.
122. Modifications may include retro-fitting of licensing buildings and facilities; conducting
background checks on personnel adjudicating and producing license documents, including creation
and implementation of policies to conduct such background checks; design, implementation, and
maintenance of  new information technology systems to comply with data sharing provisions. See
NA T ' L  CO NF ERENCE O F  ST AT E LEG I SLAT URES,  NA T I O NA L G O VERNO RS ASSO CI AT I O N A N D
AMERI CAN ASSOCIATION OF MO T O R VEHI CLE ADMINISTRATORS,  T HE REAL I D  ACT :  NAT I O NAL
IMPACT ANALYSIS 3 (2006) .
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case, state governments felt the penalty for non-compliance with the sta-
tutory program by the prospect of gaining title to radioactive waste with
all the associated legal and fiscal obligations.
123 U n d e r  R e a l  
I D ,  t h e  
f e d -
eral government essentially tells the states, "Comply, or your people will
pay the pr ice."
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New York, it is difficult to justify how the latter scenario is any less coer-
civ  than the former. DHS attempts a justification by explaining that the















































126 The interpretation, however, overlooks the underlying rationale of
the majority in New York that a "choice which leaves no choice" is fun-
damentally coercive.
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liberty of their people, including the right to interstate travel and full ac-
cess to federal courts, but if  states capitulate, they sacrifice a substantial
degree of sovereignty. Citizens who elect their state government repre-
sentatives must sacrifice sovereignty of their state governments to protect
their personal liberties. Neither the states nor their citizens should have
123. New York, 505 U.S. at 144-45.
124. See supra note 5 (quoting DHS spokesperson Laura Keehner: "There will be a practical
consequence for residents of states whose leadership chooses the status quo and accepts noncompli-
ant licenses... [T ]hey will not [be] able to fly on an aircraft or enter a federal building with a non-
compliant license"). State government officials have gotten the message. For  example, in his letter
to DHS on the eve of the March 31, 2008 deadline to request an extension for compliance with Real
ID, Governor Sanford of South Carolina appealed to Secretary Chertoff: " I, therefore, respectfully
request ask DHS to treat South Carolina's citizens the same as i t treats citizens of all other states,
including those that cannot legally comply with REAL ID and those that have not requested an ex-
tension. I  would respectfully ask that DHS will be consistent and not needlessly penalize the
citizens of South Carolina and allow them to travel and enter federal buildings like the citizens of all
other states." Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14.
125. See New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
126. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10820-01, 10,849 (proposed Mar. 9, 2007) (citing New
York, 505 U.S. at 173 ("The citizens of a given State—not Congress—ultimately will decide whether
the State complies with this regulation and the underlying statute)).
127. 505 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Mining Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) ("In this [take title] provision, Congress has not held out the threat of
xercising its spending power or its commerce power; i t has instead held Out the threat, should the
States not regulate according to one federal instruction, of  simply forcing the States to submit to
another federal instruction. A  choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques
is no choice at all. Either  way, ' [t]he Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'")). F or  a detailed
discussion of the theory of coercion, see Sullivan, supra note 98.
128. See Akhil Reed Amar, O f  Sovereignly and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1500-01
(1987). Professor Amar explains: "The independent and pre-existing organizational structures of
state governments were seen as incipient pockets of resistance—here, political resistance—to uncon-
stitutional federal conduct." Id
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to choose between equally fundamental constitutional liberties.
129 I t  i sunsatisfactory to say that the citizens of each state will ultimately choose
whether to comply with Real ID and the consequences.
1313Although state governments represent the people, they remain a
separate entity from the people, with a separate, inviolate existence as
sovereigns within the federal system.
131 S t a t e  
g o v e r n m e n t s  
m a y  
d e r i v e
power by cons nt of the governed, especially through the provisions of
individual state constitutions, yet state governments are separate entities
and not merely the proxy of the people.
132 T h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  
c o n f e r r e d
upon the national government power akin to that held by the preexistent
state governments to act directly upon the people.
133 I  h e r  
d i s s e n t i n g
opinion in Garcia, Justice O'Connor refuted the proposition that state
representatives elected to the national legislature naturally champion
their constituent state government interests in the political process.
134Similarly, it is hardly axiomatic that the interests of state governments,
particularly the interest in preserving their sovereignty, will always align
with the interests of  their citizens. T he federal travel restrictions im-
posed by Real ID create a conflict of interest between a state govern-
ment—interested in preserving the integrity of its legislative agenda—
and the people of the state—interested in preserving their ability to freely
fly and enter federal buildings.
2. Is Real ID a Program of Cooperative Federalism?
The dissenting opinion in New York characterized the take title stat-
ute, which the majority of the Court struck down as an acceptable pro-
gram of cooperative federalism. DHS seized upon similar reasoning as a
justification for Real ID's regime of federally prescribed standards for
state driver's licenses. However, the Act places federal and state inter-
ests at odds and falls far short of a cooperative enterprise.
DHS has stated that Real ID and the agency's proposed implement-
ing rules are consistent with the Tenth Amendment and are not an im-
permissible usurpation of state sovereignty.
I35 R a t h e r ,  t h e  
a g e n c y  
c l a i m s
129. See Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1426.
130. See Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. at 10849 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 173).
131. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869) ("[a]n indestructible Union, composed of inde-
structible States").
132. Amar, supra note 138.
133. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 163.
134. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 587-88 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("The political process has not protected against these encroachments on state activi-
ties, even though they directly impinge on a State's ability to make and enforce its laws.").
135. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272, 5329 (Jan. 29, 2008). DHS conducted a federal-
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that the regulations present a permissible program of cooperative federal-
ism in which the federal and state governments act voluntarily and in
tandem to achieve a common policy objective."
6 W h e n  p o l i t i c a l  
p r e s -
sure is less of  barrier to efforts tow rd increasing federal power, Con-
gress might more readily prefer to preempt state law, but when it comes
to driver's licenses and identification cards, the stakes are higher for the
federal govemment.
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of cooperative federalism reflects an awareness of the tension between
state prerogatives and national interests in this area.
Congress is understandably hesitant to preempt state law in the do-
main of driver licensing
138 b e c a u s e  
o f  
t h e  
t r a d i t i o
n a l  
l o c
a l  
q u a l





censing, the deep-rooted resentment and suspicion toward nationalization
f identification documents,
I39 a n d  t h e  
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ism impact analysis pursuant to Executive Order 13 123 regarding regulatory policies that have fed-
eralism implications. DHS claims that i t consulted extensively with the states in promulgating its
final rule and that it did so "in the spirit of Federalism" to "balance state prerogatives with the na-
tional interests at stake." I d  at 5330.
136. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,820, 10,849 (proposed Mar. 9, 2007) (citing New
York, 505 U.S. at 167, 173). Al though the majority opinion in New York acknowledged that Con-
gress may attach conditions to federal funding within its spending powers, the Court singled out the
take title provision of the challenged statute as of a different character than conditions attaching to
federal funds. 505 U.S. at 174-77. That provision "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement
from coercion." I d  This Conunent argues that Real ID sets up a statutory program that is more
analogous to the take title provision in New York than to the typical conditional exercise of congres-
sional power. The agency's argument might be more persuasive had Congress enacted a program
more akin to Real ID's predecessor statute IRTPA, which mandated negotiated rulemaking that
brings state and federal stakeholders together to develop the details for implementing national licens-
ing standards. Real ID gives a federal agency full authority to regulate through informal rulemaking
in which states and citizens may provide comment. This approach provides far greater federal gov-
ernment discretion in fleshing Out the details of the program than i t would under more formalized
negotiated rulemaldng.
137. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("By limit-
ing the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of programs,
the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself.").
138. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (indicating that pre-emption is a viable option for regula-
tion "[w]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause .
[W]e have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity accord-
ing to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. T h i s  arrangement,
which has been termed ' [a] program of cooperative federalism, is replicated in numerous federal
statutory schemes.'").
139. See discussion supra Part ILA; see also Stephen Dinan, GOP Split on Repeal of Real ID,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, available at http://washingtontimes.comiapps/pbcs.dlltarticle?AlD—
/20071114/NATION/ (quoting Rep. Sensenbrenner: " I f  there's a national policy then a driver's
license becomes a national ID card [ t h a t ]  ends up playing into the fears of the ACLU and the
people on the far right that the Real ID is in fact a national ID card.").
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istering a federal program across fifty states.
m H a v i n g  a  
l o c a l  f a c e  
o n
the administration of federal licensing policy deflects public criticism of
the federal government because state ag ncies are on the front lines and
will endure the most of the backlash.
141 T h u s ,  i n  
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o f  
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strong political incentives urge avoiding preemption of  state authority
over the driver licensing and identification function. Even if faced with a
potential constitutional challenge, the federal government will likely con-
tinue to pressure state governments into service rather than pursue a self-
aggrandizing, high-profile program of standardized licensing that would
subject its licensing agents to direct public ire.
Moreover, like the take-title provision in New York, the driver li-
censing provisions of Real ID frustrate the purposes behind the constitu-
tional structure that reinforces political accountability at the local lev-
0.142 Congress could be viewed as having taken strong steps toward im-
plementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to combat ter-
rorist tactics.
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of public interaction, however, would likely face the criticism and re-
sentment of individuals who believe that the new system compromises
their privacy and causes them greater inconvenience in obtaining driver's
licenses. B y  implementing a national program of licensing standards
through the agency of state governments, Real ID thus creates a tension
between states and the federal government that undermines the potential
for cooperation.
140. See Spencer S. Hsu, Homeland Security Retreats From Facets of 'Real ID', WASH. POST,
Nov. 4 ,  2007, available a t  http://www.washingtonpost.comiwp-dyn/contentiarticle/2007/11/03/
AR2007110300890_1.
141. See Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14 ("[This leads] some to
suggest that this legislation represents a backdoor way of implementing a national ID card without
the federal government bearing the financial or political cost of doing so.").
142. 505 U.S. at 168 ("When Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it,
state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain
accountable to the people. By  contrast, when the federal government compels states to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished."). In enacting legislation, the federal
government could take credit for solving the problem of low-level radioactive waste, but state offi-
cials, acting pursuant to the federal mandate to enforce the federal standards, would bear the brunt of
dismay at sacrifices required of particular communities targeted as sites for waste disposal. See id. at
169.
143. Before the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all but one of the
terrorist hijackers acquired some form of  identification document, even by fraud, and used those
documents to board commercial flights, rent cards, and conduct other activities leading up to the
attacks. See Minimum Standards for  Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,820, 10,830 (proposed Mar. 9, 2007) (citing
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004), which recommends implementation of  more secure
sources of identification for use in boarding aircraft and accessing vulnerable facilities).
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B. Threats to Individual Citizen Rights under Real ID
Because Real ID prohibits the use of non-compliant state-issued
identification for federal "official purposes," the Act potentially infringes
upon two rights recognized as fundamental under the Court's individual
rights jurisprudence: the right to travel and the right of access to federal
buildings.
Real ID defines "official purpose" in open terms that grant DHS
nearly unfettered agency discretion to designate other official pur-
poses.144 For now, DHS has proposed a relatively modest interpretation,
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panding the scope of the definition by inviting public comment on how
the agency might achieve such expansion.
I47 E v e n  u n d e r  
a  
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limited interpretation of the restrictions it imposes upon individuals hold-
ing non-compliant identification documents, Real ID still raises the ques-
tion of whether the Act violates the constitutional right to travel and ac-
cess federal buildings.
1. The Right to Travel
The freedom to travel throughout the United States is a basic right
recognized since the birth of the nation.
148 T h e  A r t i c l e s  
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C o n f e d e r a t i
o n
144. "The term official purpose includes but is not limited to accessing Federal facilities,
boarding federally r gulated commerci l aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, and any other pur-
pose that the Secretary shall determine." 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2005).
145. DHS proposed to limit the regulatory definition of "official purpose" to those purposes
expressly stated in the Act—accessing Federal facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, and entering
nuclear power plants. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Accept-
able by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,823.
146. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10820-01, 10,825 (proposed Mar. 9, 2007). The agen-
cy adds the following caveat to its preliminary interpretation of the scope of the official purpose
statutory term: "DHS, under discretionary authority granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security
under the Act, may expand this definition in the future." Id. at 10,823. I n  its Final Rule, DHS re-
sponded to public commentator concerns over the scope of the official purpose definition by clarify-
ing that the agency "does not agree that it must seek the approval of Congress as a prerequisite to
changing the definition in the future." Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification
Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for  Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272, 5288 (Jan. 29,
2008).
147. Id; see also Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14 ("I am also
concerned that the present law clearly provides the Secretary of DHS substantial discretion to ex-
pand the scope of REAL [ W ] e  have no assurances that at some point we won't need a REAL
ID to open a bank account or purchase a gun.").
148. Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Lynchpin of Liberty in an Age of New Federalism:
Replacing Substantive Due Process with the Right to Travel, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 469, 486 (2007). A t
various times, the right to travel has been protected by "the Citizenship Clause, the Privileges and
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explicitly cknowledged the right of the people of each state to "have
free ingress and regress to and from any other State," although this pro-
vision was never included in either the original text of the Constitution or
the Bill of  Rights.
149 I n  
U n i t e d  
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G u e s
t :









declared a fundamental right to interstate travel that has been "firmly
established an  repeatedly recognized."
151 G e n e r a l l y ,  
c o u r t s  
w i l l  
n o t
strictly scrutinize a law that restricts the movement of individuals be-
tween states unless the law regulates the right to travel as recognized by
the Court under certain limited circumstances.
On occasion, the Court has used the Privileges and immunities
Clause to invalidate state laws restricting the movement o f  persons
across state lines .
152 I n  
S a e n z  
v .  
R o e ,



















Privileges and Immunities Clause of  the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vided the basis for reviewing and striking down laws that gave prefer-
ence to long-time residents o f  a state over newly arrived c itizens.
154Writing for the majority in Saenz, Justice Stevens articulated three as-
pects of a fundamental right to travel.' 55 The restrictions imposed by
Real ID appear to fall within the first aspect, which protects the tradi-
tional right of free entry and exit across state lines, because denial of air
travel may effectively prohibit an individual from entering one state from
another. The impediment to travel across state lines is particularly acute
Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
149. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV (1778).
150.383 U.S. 745,758 (1966).
151. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 859. T he Court explained in Guest that the right to
travel is absent from the text of the Constitution because as a right so basic, it was simply assumed to
exist. Justic  Stewart wrote, "[a] right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a nec-
essary concomitant of the stronger Union that the Constitution created." Guest, 383 U.S. at 758.
Perhaps so basic a right defies codification, or perhaps it is implicit in the privileges and immunities
of national citizens protected under Article IV of the Constitution. See Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160,177-78 (1940) (Douglas, J. concurring) ("[T]he right of persons to move freely from State
to State i s  so fundamental... T he right to move freely from State to State is an incident of na-
tional citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against state interference."). Whi le acknowledging that the Court had consistently rejected claims
under the privileges and immunities clause since the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Jackson stated:
"This Court should, however, hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the United States,
protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union . "  Id. at 183 (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
152. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
153. M
154. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502.
155. Id at 500 (the three aspects of a fundamental right to travel are: (1) protection of the right
of a citizen of one state to enter and to leave another state; (2) the right to be treated as a welcome
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second state; and (3) for those
travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
state).
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in cases where distances of hundreds or thousands of miles separate the
traveler from his destination.
I56 However, Saenz involved a durational residency requirement under
state law; its application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause could
be narrowly limited to similar situations. Real ID entails federal gov-
ernment regulation of travel on federally regulated commercial aircraft
over airspace subject to federal jurisdiction. The Court in recent years
has endorsed strict scrutiny of state laws that impede interstate reloca-
tion, but it has resisted applying such strict review of all laws that might
serve as a type of barrier to interstate travel 15-1
The ability to travel freely through the common airways bears upon
the social and economic vitality o f a unified national entity. Denying .
travel to some state citizens while allowing those
compliant identification documents to fly wil l  likely provoke frustration
and resentment among the travehreslricted state citizens. The result will
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little protection to citizens adversely affected by Real ID.
Because
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I muni ies Clause is likely limited to state government action, the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause may prove More :fertile ground for root-
ing protections :of the _:_ftdarrientat right to travet Jeateued
156. 'Drie-two non-contiguous states, Alaska and _
laws rejecting Real ID. One can prily imagine the challena
within the Union without aceess to tominercial air transport.
157. In addition, the Court has said that the Article 1V Privileges and Immunities Clause
plies "[olnly with respect to those privileges and immunities bearing upon the vitalityo f ti
- s a single entity," and that the interest protected by the Meuse must be 'sufficiently fundatne
the promotion of interstate harmony." See CH EMERINSKt  p r a  nom 77, at 469,
158. The
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Amendment does open the door to funnie expansions of its applicability beyond durational residency
requirement scenarios. I d  at-498_ HoWever; as noted by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Saenz,
before invoking the clause the Court "should endeavor to understand what the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment thought that i t meant, W e should also consider whether the Clause should dis-
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526 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J,, e
159. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77
, a t  4 6 6 ,  
T h e  
S u p r e m e  
C o u r t  
h a s  
i n
sing- the ability of a state to discriminate against those from out of state with gar d t
,tat rights or  important economic activities, I d  M os t cases under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause involved challenges to state and local laws that discriminate against out-of-staters regarding
heir ability to earn a living. Id. Further, the protection of  the clause is limited to citizens of the
United States, as opposed to aliens. Id

























































ID, the federal government arguably infringes the liberty of national citi-
zens. The right to travel freely among the states is an essential aspect of
liberty, which a citizen should only abdicate for a compelling govern-
ment interest.
161 
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eral government have arisen in the context of restrictions upon individual
liberty to travel internationally, Fifth Amendment protections can rea-
sonably extend to the traditional sphere of interstate travel by citizens.
At least one federal court has held, however, that an individual does
not enjoy complete constitutional protection over the freedom to select
any mode of transportation.
162 I n  
G i l m o r e  
v .  
G o n z a l e s ,
1 6 3  
a  
N i n t
h  
C i r c
u i t
Court of Appeals panel held that there is no constitutional right to travel
by a particular means, such as air trave1.
164 M r .  G i l m o r e  
h a d  
r e f u s e d  
t o
show any identificat on at an airport security checkpoint.
I65 U n d e r  t h e s efacts, Gilmore may stand for the narrower proposition that the Constitu-
tion does not protect one's right to travel unimpeded without carrying
any form of identification.
Still, the question remains whether the refusal of a particular mode
of interstate transportation to one who actually presents a state-issued
160. The Supreme Court does not recognize a fundamental r ight to international travel, al-
though dicta in early decisions suggested such right. Justice Douglas has written: "The right to travel
is a part of the 'liberty' of  which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment.... Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers
as well, wa  part of our heritage. F r eedom  of movement is basic in our scheme of values." Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,125-26 (1958). However, in subsequent cases rejecting claims based on
both the right to travel and the First Amendment right to gather information by traveling to foreign
countries, the Court stressed foreign policy justifications for the restrictions. Most cases involved
refusals by the Department of State to issue passports to U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1(1965). Recent cases have applied only rational basis review to restrictions on foreign travel.
See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (applying rational basis test to uphold federal regula-
tion banning travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,306 (1981) ("[t]he free-
dom to travel abroad i s  subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations; as
such, it is subject to reasonable government regulation [ t ] h e  freedom to travel outside the United
States must be distinguished from the right to travel within the United States."); Califano v. Aznavo-
rian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1978) ("[I]egislation which is said to infringe the freedom to travel
abroad is not to be judged by the same standard applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate
travel, such as durational residency requirements . . " ) .
161. Although Fifth Amendment challenges to travel restrictions by the federal government
have generally addressed limitations upon international travel by U.S. citizens, and although the
Court applied rational basis review in such cases, strict scrutiny still applies to interstate freedom of
travel claims under that body of jurisprudence. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 868-71.
162. Froomkin, supra note 47, at 59.
163. Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125,1136-39 (9th Cir. 2006).
164. Id
165. Id.
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identification document implicates the right to interstate trave1.
166 D e -spite alternative modes of transportation available to a traveler denied
access to a flight, air travel is an essential aspect of modem social mobil-
ity nationwide and constitutes a vital element of interstate commerce.
Perhaps the social and economic interests in unimpeded access to air tra-
vel for otherwise law-abiding citizens would compel a court to acknowl-
edge that the mobility fundamental to modem liberty demands unre-
stricted domestic air trave1.
167 In addition, because Real ID impairs the right of a discrete class of
persons—those carrying non-compliant state-issued driver's licenses or
identification cards—to travel using commercial airlines, the Act could
be subject to judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
168However, the Court generally limits its recognition of protected classes
under the Equal Protection Clause to groups based upon race or national
or igin.
169 Even i f  the travel restriction imposed by Real ID were subject to
close judicial scrutiny under a privileges and immunities, due process, or
equal protection theory, a court could find that any such restriction is
narrowly tailored to a compelling national security interest.
m T h e  g o v -ernment argues that individuals with state-issued identification cards that
















































preserving the security of national airways post 9/11, the interest of indi-
166. Mr. Gilmore refused to show any identification at the airport. Id. at 1130. The security
policy at issue in the case required presentation of some form of identification and pre-dated imple-
mentation of Real ID.
167. The court in Gilmore did not acknowledge that need for access to air travel squarely but
neither did it question Gilmore's allegation that "air travel is a necessity." Id. at 1136.
168. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been incorporated into the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as against the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
169. Discrimination based on race or national origin is subjected to strict scrutiny; an interme-
diate level of scrutiny has been applied to discrimination based upon gender or against children born
out of  wedlock. I n  most other cases, the Court simply applies a rational basis review. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 671-73. See also id. at 668 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208
(1927) ("[The Equal Protection Clause is] the last resort of constitutional arguments.")).
170. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 673-74.
171. DHS says as much in its Final Rule. Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Iden-
tification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for  Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272, 5288
(Ian. 29, 2008) ("Moreover, travelers will be able to use identification other than a Real ID driver's
license or card. . W her e individuals are allowed to board aircraft or enter Federal facilities with
documents other than a State-issued driver's license or identification [such as a passport or military




















vidual citizens in using non-compliant state issued identification for in-
terstate travel may appear to some as simply a matter of convenience.
172 One can envision many scenarios in which citizens, particularly
those of limited financial means, have never traveled abroad and do not
possess a U.S. passport as an alternative form of identification. Given
that passport application processing can take several months, the stric-
tures of Real ID would significantly hinder the ability of a citizen with a
driver's license from a state not complying with Real ID to engage in
oss-country air travel.' F o r  example, access to an travel is more than
a matter of convenience for a person without a passport in Washington
State whose mother dies in Washington D.C. i f  it means he might miss
her funeral.
Nevertheless, even such a strong individual interest in unimpeded
domestic air travel may not overcome what the Court could find to be a
more compelling national security interest in federal regulation of  air
travel through Real ID. As  such, right-to-travel jurisprudence, even i f
extended to apply where Real ID hampers air travel for those without
compliant driver's licenses, probably fails to protect the fundamental
freedom of all citizens to travel throughout the Union.
2. The Right of Access to Federal Courts
DHS's interpretation of Real ID, as reflected in its implementing
proposed regulations, leaves open the question whether the nature of ac-
cess procedures at a given federal building will determine an individual's
right of access to federal courts. I f  a particular federal building's secu-
rity procedures require state-issued identification, then citizens of non-
compliant states could face infringement of that right under Real 111
174
172. DHS articulates the overarching justification for Real ID as a congressional response to
the recommendations of  the 9/11 Commission to combat perceived vulnerabilities in a system of
national identification based on state-issued driver's licenses with varying issuance standards. Pro-
ponents of national standards for  identification documents cite the example of the September I I
terrorist attacks as an exploitation of vulnerabilities in this de facto system of national identification.
See Minimum Standards for  Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,820, 10,830 (proposed Mar. 9, 2007) (noting that all
but one of the terrorists obtained, legitimately or by fraud, state-issued identifications that permitted
them to rent cars, move about the country, and ultimately board the aircraft that they hijacked).
173. While expedited passport processing is often available for those with imminent interna-
tional travel, the State Department may not be willing to provide faster processing for those who
plan to remain inside the United States. Expedited processing of passport applications generally
takes about two weeks, although a faster track may be available where international travel has been
booked and one can schedule an in person appearance at a local U.S. Passport Agency office.
174. " If the individual intends to use a State-issued driver's license or identification card, how-
ever, i t must be one that is issued by a State that is complying with Real ID Act." Minimum Stan-
dards for  Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official
Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,823.
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As with the restriction on commercial air travel, this restriction upon en-
trance to federal buildings assumes that a U.S. citizen could present a
U.S. passport instead of a state-issued driver's license. However, many
U.S. citizens do not hold passports:
75 a n d  m a n y  
l e g a l  
U . S .  
r e s i d e n t
s  
o t h -
erwise subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court system and entitled
to r dress within that system cannot obtain a U.S. passport:
76 B a r r i n gacceptance of  foreign passports as sufficient identification, these indi-
viduals could face exclusion from the courthouse.
The constitutionally protected right to access the federal court sys-
tem is grounded in the First Amendment right to redress the government




















































"lies at the foundation of all well-ordered systems of jurisprudence" and
is "founded in the first principles of natural jus tice."
178 R e c e n t l y ,  t h eCourt articulat d a fundamental constitutional right of physical access to
courts in Tennessee v. Lane.
I79 The requirement to present photo identification for  admission to
federal facilities, standing alone, likely does not tread upon an individ-
ual's right to access the federal courts:
86 T h e  j u d i c i a r y  
h a s  
a n  
i n t e r e s t  
i n
preserving order in its courtrooms, and some regulation of physical ac-
cess to buildings housing courtrooms proceeds rationally from that inter-
est. In Foti v. McHugh,
I81 a  N i n t h  
C i r c u i t  













constitutional righ  to enter a federal building anonymously,182 citing
Gilmore as authority :
83 T h e  
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175. Froomkin, supra note 47, at 59 n.8. Over  the past ten years, the State Department has
issued between 5.5 and 10.1 million passports per fiscal year. Even i f all of those passports were
issued to adults, the number would still total less than one third of the total U.S. population.
176. For example, lawful permanent residents and other foreign nationals legally present with-
in the United States pursuant to an authorized asylum claim are not eligible for a U.S. passport be-
cause they are not U.S. citizens.
177. CHEMERISNKY, supra note 77, at 907-08.
178. Id. (quoting Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 280 (1876)).
179. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). However, most decisions considering the scope of the right of ac-
cess to the courts under due process and equal protection have done so in three major areas: (1) the
right to appeal; (2) challenges to filing fee requirements; and (3) prisoners' access to the judiciary.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 908.
180. See United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2005) (a requirement that court visitors
must show photo identification does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to public trial). Never-
theless, the court took judicial notice of actions by the executive branch to enforce security measures
by restricting access: "We are, however, concerned by the Marshals Service's restrictions of court
access and wish to underscore the primary role of the courts in controlling access to premises con-
taining courtrooms." Id. at 569.
181. Foti v. McHugh, No. 05-16079, 2007 WL 2472340 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2007).
182. M
183. Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1136-39 (9th Cir. 2006).
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argument that the restrictions imposed by Real ID effectively impede
individual access to the federal courts.
184 The issue presented by the restriction imposed by Real ID, how-
ever, is broader than whether individuals have a right of anonymous ac-
cess to federal buildings. Rather, Real ID potentially precludes persons
with otherwise valid government-issued identification documents from
access to the courthouse. Furthermore, Gilmore involved a requirement
to show identification to board a commercial fl ight.
I85 T h e r e  m a y  
b e  c o -
gent reasons for refusing to recognize a constitutional right to travel by
particular means because there are other options available for travel;
however, with Real ID's restriction on the use of non-compliant state
documents,
I86 t h e  
o b j e c
t i v e  
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able because restriction of entrance to facility housing the court results in
denial of access to the justice system.'"
V. PROTECTING THE PEOPLE THROUGH THE TENTH AMENDMENT
Threats to individual liberty are real under Real ID, but historical
individual rights jurisprudence may not sufficiently shield individuals
from the Act's arguably overreaching federal regulation of state driver
licensing. Under existing individual-rights jurisprudence, courts might
countenance claims by non-compliant state citizens that the statutory air
travel and building access restrictions hinder free interstate travel and
deny redress in federal courts. Even so, Real ID, with its national secu-
rity impetus, would pass rational basis review and may even survive
close judicial scrutiny. As  applied to Real ID, neither of these rights af-
fords sufficient protection to individual citizens. Rather, judicial en-
forcement of  the Tenth Amendment would preserve state sovereignty
against federal coercion while also protecting the liberty of the People
against encroachment upon their right to travel and to access the federal
court system.
First, the right to travel, though long recognized, lacks clear groun-
ding in specific constitutional provisions, and the weight of precedent
184. Of course, as an unpublished opinion, Foil contains little analysis that might offer mean-
ingful guidance about expanding or narrowing the applicability of its holding in future cases.
185. Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1136-39.
186. Most citizens use driver's licenses as their principal form of identification and do not hold
a federal passport. Egelman, supra note 11, at 150. Since the State Department within the Execu-
tive Branch controls issuance of the primary alternative photo identification document available to
U.S. citizens, a passport, a citizen's right of access to the federal courts could become subject to the
exclusive authority of the federal government. Passports are inherently external travel documents
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Executive Branch with its sweeping discretion over for-
eign affairs. See supra note 160 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981)).
187. This concern is especially pronounced in the criminal context, given Sixth Amendment
protections of the rights of the accused to confront witnesses against him.
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addresses state government intrusions upon citizen mobility, particularly
in the area of durational residency requirements.
188 W i t h  R e a l  
I D ,  t h e
federal government may infringe upon a right of national citizenship to
travel among states without substantial interference. Perhaps courts
would recognize the interference experienced by citizens from non-
compliant states as a significant deprivation of the right to travel via an
indispensable form of modem conveyance. O n the other hand, at least
one federal court has indicated that there is not a constitutional right to
travel by a particular means. 189 In the case of Real ID, citizens from non-
compliant states could obtain U.S. passports or elect other means of
transportation, such as rail or bus, notwithstanding the contention that the
pace of modem commercial activity demands interstate air travel.'"
Second, although grounded firmly in Bill of Rights protections,
191the right of access to federal courts may appear compelling and capable
of judicial enforcement, that argument for enforcing that right lacks im-
petus in the context of Real ID. Prior right of access cases focus on unre-
lated fact patterns,
I92 a n d  
a t  
l e a s t  
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f e d e
r a l  
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ernment's right to impose identification document requirements for ac-
cess to federal buildings housing courtrooms.
193 W h e t h e r  
l i m i t i n g  
t h e
range of acc ptable forms of identification to exclude a substantial num-
ber of state citize s holding driver's licenses or identification cards as
their sole form of photo identification violates the right of access to the
courts remains an open question.
In contrast to the weakness of individual-rights jurisprudence as a
challenge to Real ID, close judicial scrutiny of the federalism issues im-
plicated by the Act effectively serves a dual purpose:
94 F i r s t ,  s u c h  r e -
188. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); see also Califano v. Azavorian, 439 U.S. 170
(1978) (drawing a clear distinction between freedom to travel abroad and the recognized constitu-
tional the right of interstate travel, as affected, for example, by durational residency requirements).
189. See Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1125.
190. But see Foti v. McHugh, No. 05-16079, 2007 WL 2472340 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2007).
191. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
192. The fact patterns considered in the past cases include the right to appeal, challenges to
filing fee requirements, and prisoners' access to judiciary. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 910; see,
.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (prisons obligated to provide law library facilities to
inmates); Bobbie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (unconstitutional to deny indigent individual
access to courts for filing of a divorce petition because of inability to pay fees); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (court transcripts must be provided to indigent criminal defendants on appeal).
193. See Foil, No. 05-16079, 2007 WL 2472340.
194. For a thorough treatment of an argument in favor of judicial enforcement of federalism-
based limits on national power, see Jackson, supra note 82, at 2182-83 ("Appropriately deferential
judicial review can help reinforce the political branches' roles in considering the interests of state
governments with the other interests the national government must advance, while maintaining the
principled flexibility federalism requires."). However , Professor Jackson argues for  a multi-
factored, flexible standard—as opposed to the categorical rule in Printz—against commandeering of
state government processes. Id.
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view fortifies the structural safeguards of federalism by expanding Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence to prevent usurpation o f  state government
sovereignty.
195 
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the judiciary can effectively preserve the liberty of the People.
196 Although the federalism principles revived by the Rehnquist Court
may have infused state and local governments with new strength to assert
their authority under the Tenth Amendment, those principles have been








































should focus on leveraging classic federalism principles to promote indi-
vidual liber ty .
198 T h e  
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c t  
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e r  
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pand Tent  Amendment protections of state sovereignty against federal
excess and to assert federalism as a principled and effective bulwark
against invasions of citizen liberty by the federal government where ex-
isting individual rights jurisprudence, rooted in substantive due process
and equal protection, may prove an inadequate defense.
199 As Professor Garry observes, "the Framers viewed the structural
provision of federalism as a default protection of individual liberty, oper-
ating continually as an institutional mechanism to check forces that
might threaten that liberty.',200 Unlike the modem Court, the Framers
relied more upon these structural provisions of the Constitution to coun-
ter governmental abuses of power than upon judicial enforcement of in-
dividual substantive r ights .
m T h i s  
s t r u c t u r a l  
e s t r a i n
t ,  
e m b o d
i e d  
i n  
t h
e
federalism and separation of powers doctrines, rather than reliance upon
195. See discussion supra Part IVA.
196. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States' Rights Blues to Blue States' Rights: Federalism
After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. ItEv. 799 (2006). Professor Sullivan observes the theo-
retical depth and significance of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival, even i f  the practical ef-
fects of its major holdings, including those in New York and Printz, were not as sweeping as might
be perceived. Id. at 809. She contends that the Rehnquist Court dramatically revived the structural
principles of federalism as grounds for judicial invalidation of statues. This redevelopment of the
political theory of federalism reminds us of our more overarching constitutional commitments to
social fluidity. Id. at 813. As such, a revived structural federalism provides a theory to promote the
freedom for local social experimentation that can help realize progressive as well as conservative
ideals. M  at 801.
197. Garry, supra note 148, at 469-70.
198. M
199. Amar, supra note 128, at 1519 ("Even i f  states have not always taken seriously their role
in protecting individual constitutional rights against the federal government, they should do so.").
200. Garry, supra note 148, at 481.
201. See id. at 492 (quoting Isaac J.K. Adams, Growing Pains: The Scope of Substantive Due
Process Rights of Parents o f
-
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the Due Process Clause has served as the Supreme Court's 'chosen vessel' for  the protection of
unenumerated rights.")).
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judicially defined individual rights, preserved political freedom and pro-
vided safeguards against federal tyranny.202
Indeed, to the Framers, the primary justification of federalism was
not diversity or state competition
203 b u t  t h e  
r o l e  o f  
t h e  
s t a t e s  
a s  
g u a r d i a
n s
against possible federal tyranny.
204 A l e x a n d e r  
H a m i l t o n  
a r g u e d  
t h a t  
i n -
dividuals who felt their rights violated by the central government could
use the state governments as the instruments of redress.
205 A  r e p u b l i c a ngovernment differs in nature from a free government.
206 P r o f e s s o r  G a r r yexplains l_wlhereas a free government focuses on securing specified in-
dividual rights, a republican government endeavors to achieve political
freedom as a means of securing individual freedom."
207 T h u s ,  t h e  p r i -mary safeguards against government tyranny were architectural and are
evident in the structure of the Constitution.
m There are real weaknesses in some of the potential arguments that
Real ID contravenes the fundamental individual rights of citizens to tra-
vel freely throughout the country and to access the federal courts freely.
However, by upholding federalism principles, states can effectively chal-
lenge the threat to their sovereignty under Real ID. In doing so, they can
also preserve the freedom of  their citizens and convince Congress to
202. Garry, supra note 69, at 874 ("The system of dual sovereignty between national and state
governments was designed largely to create a government that would protect the liberty of its citi-
zens."). Professor Garry cites mobility of the population as key to the ability of individuals to move
to states aligned with their visions of individual liberty. Id.
203. See Jackson, supra note 82, at 2214-15 (citing examples of potential benefits of federal-
ism identified in scholarly literature on the subject).
204. Garry, supra note 69, at 875 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179-80 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that the states "will in all possible contingencies afford
complete security against invasions of public liberty by the national authority . " ) ) .  Id. at n.141.
The Framers believed that the states would serve to check any encroachments by the national gov-
ernment on the liberties of the people. See id. at n.142 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
205. Id at 875-76.
206. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179-80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
207. Garry, supra note 69, at 875-76. Professor Garry makes a compelling argument that
modem notions of individual rights tend toward being anti-social. Such rights, often judicially de-
fined under post-New Deal substantive due process jurisprudence, are characterized by an "exagger-
ated absoluteness hyper individual ism, i ns ul ar i t y ,  and s i l e n c e  with respect to personal,
civic, and collective responsibilities." Gar r y, supra note 69, at 883-85 (quoting MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 4,24 (1991)). He posits
that the Framers did not view human beings as solitary creatures devoid of interpersonal relation-
ships or obligations to society. I d  The Constitution contemplates democratic society as a political
family: there must be processes with the family structure to give each member some individual free-
dom, yet also to bind each member to the family as a whole. Id. Thus, the Constitution primarily
concerns the workings of the democratic community. See id. at 884.
208. Structural protections permit flexible and dynamic safeguards of liberty by shaping indi-
vidual freedoms according to democratic desires and interests of the governed that evolve over time.
See id at 885.
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openly debate whether the People will accede to a national identification
program—the debate that was absent from the enactment of Real ID•
209
VI. CONCLUSION
The present situation concerning implementation of Real ID is un-
tenable. A t  a minimum, current state opposition undermines the imple-
mentation of a comprehensive and standardized identification system that
serves the national security purposes for which Congress purportedly
enacted Real ID .
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indeed force the federal government to employ the political process to
enact workable legislation after full debate of issues raised by a program
of national identification!" Congress should repeal the driver licensing
provisions of  Real ID and address the real concerns of  the American
people regarding national identification programs. O f  course, Congress
could demur and simply leave Real ID on the books, in which case the
political process involving state representation in the national legislature
may fail to satisfy the desires of either the states or its people.






















































Alternatively, states should bring actions within the judicial system
to challenge the constitutionality of Real ID as coercive of their govern-
209. See Letter from Mark Sanford to Michael Chertoff, supra note 14 ("[I] join with millions
of Americans in believing that national policy changes should be debated, not dictated—and REAL
ID was never fully debated in Congress. • [R ]ather  than compelling states to comply with REAL
ID with the threat of longer wait times for their citizens in airports across the country, I think the
American people deserve a full and robust debate on whether REAL ID will provide greater national
security, and, i f  so, whether the increased security outweighs the risks to our privacy interests and
other costs that arise from creating a national ID system.").
210. See discussion supra Part I V.A.1.
211. The fate of proposed legislation to repeal all or part of Real ID remains cloudy. Imple-
mentation of the Act meanwhile forges ahead in the face of clear rejection by a significant number of
states.
212. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth,, 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the political process and "[w]orkings of  the National Government itself,
rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority" may not defend interests of the
people). Justice O'Connor further observes that "[Ole past two decades have seen an unprecedented
growth of federal regulatory activity," and she concludes that "Noday, as federal legislation and
coercive grant programs have expanded to embrace innumerable activities that were once viewed as
local, the burden of persuasion has surely shifted, and the extraordinary has become ordinary." I d
213. Concerns regarding funding, timelines, and privacy issues. DHS claims that it seriously
considered concerns raised by the public during the notice and comment period (wherein it received
over 21,000 public comments on its proposed rule) and incorporated those considerations into its
final rule. See Minimum Standards for  Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. at 5274.
214. See Coakley Testimony, supra note 54, at 3.
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ments. I n  this way, states can support the interests of the people in free
interstate movement and equal access to federal facilities, including
courts. Absent judicial action to uphold state sovereignty on the Tenth
Amendment grounds, the citizens of several states will very likely re-
ceive unequal treatment within the Union and so will pay the ultimate
price for Real ID's misguided reforms.
